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Abstract. This study aims to define a theoretical framework of the main organisa-
tional theories identifying how the board composition influences both CSR activity
and disclosure. Based on a selective literature review, the analysis highlights the
implications of each organisational theory on non-financial information disclosure
and board’s role. Specifically, the research shows that the management’s influence on
non-financial information practice of an organisation is not emphasized by all orga-
nizational theories. In addition, based on the research results, non-financial informa-
tion can should be considered as an organizational tool to legitimise the firm per-
formance and manage the perception of enterprises stakeholders. The study could be
further developed by applying quantitative research methods, such as a multiple case
study approach, which is useful to explore the dissemination of a new phenomenon.
Key words: corporate social responsibility, disclosure of non-financial information,
Corporate Governance, board of directors, corporate social responsibility disclosure.
Sommario. L’influenza del management sull’informativa non finanziaria se-
condo le principali teorie organizzative. Lo studio mira a definire un quadro teori-
co delle principali teorie organizzative, identificando come la composizione del
board impatta sulla responsabilità sociale d’impresa. Mediante una review della let-
teratura, il lavoro si propone di evidenziare le implicazioni che ciascuna teoria orga-
19
* Full Professor Business Management Sapienza, University of Rome, bernardino.quat-
trociocchi@uniroma1.it 
** Ph.D. student in Governance and Management for Business Innovation, University
Niccolò Cusano, silvia.sergiacomi@unicusano.it  
*** Research Fellow Business Management Sapienza, University of Rome, france-
sco.mercuri@uniroma1.it 
Corporate Governance and Research & Development Studies, supplemento al n. 1-2019
ISSN 2704-8462
Copyright © FrancoAngeli   
This work is released under Creative Commons Attribution - Non-Commercial - NoDerivatives License. 
For terms and conditions of usage please see: http://creativecommons.org
nizzativa prevede circa la divulgazione di informazioni non finanziarie e l’influen-
za del board. In particolare, la ricerca mostra che non tutte le teorie organizzative
considerano l’influenza della direzione sulla realizzazione e divulgazione delle
informazioni non finanziarie. Inoltre, secondo quanto emerso, la promozione di
informazioni non finanziarie inerenti l’azienda è da considerarsi strumento utile nel
legittimare le performance aziendali e influenzare la percezione e le aspettative
degli stakeholder.  
Infine, lo studio potrebbe essere ulteriormente sviluppato applicando metodi di
ricerca quantitativa, come un “multiple case study approach”, utile per esplorare la
diffusione del fenomeno. 
Parole chiave: responsabilità sociale delle imprese, promozione delle informazioni
non finanziarie, organo di governo. 
1. Introduction
According to Gray et al. (2010, p. 6), 
«Theory is, at its simplest, a conception of the relationship between things. It
refers to a mental state or framework and, as a result, determines, inter alia, how
we look at things, how we perceive things, what things we see as being joined to
other things and what we see as “good” and what we see as “bad”. Specifically,
regarding social accounting, it is necessary to have theories that help us to observe,
organise, and explain a series of things, such as defining what is meant by social
accounting, its effects, what problems the social accounting seeks to solve, and
what makes a good or bad practice of social accounting» (Gray et al., 2010).
Within corporate social responsibility (CSR) accounting, a series of the-
ories was produced concerning the motivation of companies to disclose
information about their CSR activities and the explanation of why an organ-
isation tends to disclose IC information (An et al., 2011; Dumay and Guthrie,
2017). In other words, theories combine different approaches and use the
same terminology with different meanings (Garriga and Melè, 2004). 
Many of these theories are interrelated and are part of an integrated
framework based on the premise that corporate disclosure has a positive
effect on corporate performance by, for example, reducing information
asymmetry, discharging accountability, signalling legitimacy, and achiev-
ing excellence (An et al., 2011). In this paper, we analyse the main organ-
isational theories that have implications for non-financial information dis-
closure and disclosure of diversity information. 
Social accounting is an essential aspect of CSR; in fact, it is considered as
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a mechanism aimed at enhancing corporate accountability and transparency
to stakeholders, addressing the social, environmental, and ethical values.
Moreover, the establishment of the mechanisms for monitoring and control-
ling a company’s activities falls within the responsibility of the board of
directors, which, therefore, is responsible for the accountability and trans-
parency of a company through information disclosure (Dias et al., 2017).
Thus, based on the relation between the board decisions and the involvement
in CSR practices and related disclosure, it may be interesting to analyse how
the board composition influences the CSR activity and the CSR disclosure.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section
reviews the theoretical foundations of Corporate Governance and CSR,
highlighting the board’s capability to influence disclosure of non-financial
information. The third section analyses the main organisational theories to
identify their implications for non-financial information disclosure and
board’s role. Finally, the last section presents our discussion and conclusion.
2. CSR and the board of directors 
According to Bear et al. (2010), Corporate Governance and corporate
sustainability should not be considered independently of each other.
Corporate Governance planning requires the implementation of sustainable
goals, which provides structural measures that have repercussions on the
company’s establishment. Therefore, it is important to redefine the gover-
nance system that is responsible for defining and implementing corporate
sustainability strategies (Van Marrewijk, 2003).
Specifically, the link between Corporate Governance and corporate sus-
tainability is defined as a two-way relationship. It is important that corpo-
rate sustainability governance is part of the corporate leadership, so
Corporate Governance needs to be reconfigured and corporate sustainabil-
ity has to be integrated into a company’s functions transversally involving
all management processes (Naciti, 2019).
CSR can be defined as an activity of companies that look beyond prof-
its and pay more attention to transparency, ethical values, relationships with
employees, and respect for the law. In other words, CSR is the strategy with
which a firm expresses its identity and the actions that allow applying this
identity. Based on enlarged governance, CSR has effects on the internal
organisation of the company and the external context with which it is active
(Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Specifically, the internal dimension of the
company includes the management of human resources, workers’ rights,
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health and safety at work, and the management of natural resources and
environmental effects. Among these aspects, the most important field for
the application of social responsibility practices is the internal management
of human resources. On the other side, the external dimension on which the
CSR has effects is related to consumers, local communities, suppliers and
customers, and environmental, social, and human rights issues. 
Based on the CSR perspective, non-financial disclosure has become
fundamental because it involves broader aspects than financial accounting
for shareholders, such as the different dimensions related to the social,
environmental, ethical, risk, and governance aspects, which may be of
interest to all stakeholders (Manes-Rossi et al., 2018). According to
Aldrugi and Abdo (2014), the importance of CSR disclosure is highlighted
by different aspects; in fact, it produces many benefits for both the society
in which the entity operates and the reporting entity. Moreover, compre-
hensive disclosure of the CSR activities and sustainability position of a
firm represents its reporting quality (Abdo and Al-Drugi, 2012). Thus, the
dissemination of the transparency culture allows recovering the effective-
ness of economic and financial communication. 
CSR reporting aims to respond to external pressures arising from dif-
ferent stakeholders; in fact, it is considered as a way of communication
between an enterprise and its stakeholders, providing information about an
enterprise’s strategy, social policies, and CSR performance (Dumay, 2016;
Dumay et al., 2015; Matuszak and Ròzanska, 2017). In other words, dis-
closing CSR information means providing information about the social and
environmental aspects of the company’s operations. Therefore, according
to Carini et al. (2017), non-financial information could help managers, and
other stakeholders, to make decisions more consciously.
In addition to the relationship with corporate sustainability, Corporate
Governance allows defining how companies are organised by specifying
the function, structure, and role of the board of directors. The board of
directors of a firm is the body that determines policies for corporate man-
agement and makes decisions on major company issues (Naciti, 2019), so
it ensures close alignment between the interests of shareholders and man-
agers. In other words, the board is the main vehicle by which Corporate
Governance takes place, so based on the direction of the firm’s operations
and decision-making, it is responsible for protecting the specific interests
of stakeholders of a firm. Therefore, according to Terjesen et al. (2014),
strong Corporate Governance can mitigate agency problems and encourage
managers to operate properly.
Recently, the composition of corporate boards and board diversity has
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been a growing research field (Cucari et al., 2018; Huse et al., 2009;
Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Seierstad et al., 2017; Solimene et al., 2017).
Board diversity can be defined as variety in the composition of the board
of directors, and it may affect the effectiveness of the corporate board in a
different way because it is presented as both fiduciary and advisory (Hoang
et al., 2016).
3. The roles of the board according to the main organisational theories
In the following sections, we analyse the main organisational theories in
order to identify their implications on non-financial information disclosure
and board’s role. Therefore, we performed a selective literature review of
the main organisational theories, selecting in particular those that reveal a
specific focus on non-financial information practice and, also, the motiva-
tion that leads a firm to disclose CSR information (An et al., 2011; Dumay
and Guthrie, 2017). Moreover, we identify the theories that highlight the
significant roles of the board of directors in order to describe how it should
be structured to deal efficiently with the relationships with the main organ-
isational actors. In addition, in order to define a theoretical framework, for
each theory we highlighted its implications on non-financial information
disclosure and board’s role.
3.1. Agency theory
An agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) «as a
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent» (p. 308). The most
commonly studied principal-agent relationships are between the sharehold-
er and the management, the major and minor owners, and the creditor and
shareholder (or management) of an organisation, categorised into three
types of the agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gilson and Gordon,
2003). Specifically, both the principal and the agent are utility maximisers,
so they try to maximise their individual interests, and, consequently, their
interests are not aligned; this can cause conflicts of interest, producing the
agency problem, which can only be avoided if the parties fully share the
same interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to Ness and Mirza (1991), in the agency theory field, man-
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agers tend to disclose information if it involves an increase of their bene-
fits, which, in other words, occurs when the benefits deriving from disclo-
sure are higher than the related costs. However, referring to the agency the-
ory and CSR disclosure, non-financial disclosure reduces the information
asymmetry between the principal and the agent, and also between share-
holders and the management in the corporate context. As a result, it could
eliminate agency problems and reduce opportunistic behaviour, offering to
shareholders the opportunity to monitor the company (An et al., 2011).
Agency theory is among the most recognised in research on the contri-
bution of boards (Huse, 2007). This approach provides the rationale for the
board’s critical function of monitoring management on behalf of the share-
holders (Fama and Jensen, 1983); thus, the board needs the appropriate mix
of experience and capabilities to evaluate management and assess business
strategies and their impact on CSR (Bear et al., 2010). 
According to agency theory, «board contribution to organizational per-
formance occurs by reducing agency cost arising from noncompliance of
executives with established goals and procedures, by articulating share-
holders’ objectives and focusing the attention of key executives on compa-
ny performance, and through strategic decision making and control» (Huse,
2007, p. 123). Concerning board diversity, agency theory suggests that
diversity of the corporate board leads to the increase of board independence
and a consequent improvement of the ability of the board to monitor man-
agement, with a positive impact on the firm’s financial performance
(Galbreath, 2018).
3.2. Shareholder theory
Shareholder theory treats the shareholders as the only group to which
the organisation must be socially responsible, because it assumes that the
interests of management and shareholders are the same. According to
Friedman (1970), a corporation is an artificial person, and so it may have
artificial responsibilities because only people can have responsibilities, but
“business” as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this
vague sense. 
From the shareholder perspective, in a private-property system with a
free enterprise, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the
business who has direct responsibility to his or her employers to manage
the business in line with their wishes. Thus, the corporate executive is an
agent who serves the interests of his or her principal (Friedman, 1970)
24
Copyright © FrancoAngeli   
This work is released under Creative Commons Attribution - Non-Commercial - NoDerivatives License. 
For terms and conditions of usage please see: http://creativecommons.org
based on the deontological obligations deriving from the contract between
managers and shareholders (Mansell, 2013). In other words, managers have
a moral duty to maximise the value of the investment of their principals
(shareholders). 
Regarding non-financial disclosure, shareholders require companies to
disclose information concerning their prospects for future performance and
the sustainability of actual value-creation drivers. This involves effective
communication about the risks that affect a firm’s strategies and the actions
aimed to reduce as much as possible the risk of failures and make the most
of emerging opportunities (Antonelli et al., 2016). Therefore, based on
stakeholder theory, an organisation pursues CSR practices in order to
understand and satisfy its stakeholders.
3.3. Stewardship theory
According to Davis et al. (1997), «stewardship theory defines situations
in which managers are not motivated by individual goals, but rather are
stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals»
(p. 21). In order to achieve collective goals, the steward tends to put in
place collectivist and pro-organisational behaviours, trying to achieve the
objectives of the organisation (Davis et al., 1997; Di Carlo, 2017).
According to stewardship theory, the behaviour of the executive is aligned
with the interests of the principals, and consequently, there is a strong rela-
tionship between the principal’s satisfaction and the success of the organisa-
tion (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1989, 1991). In fact, in max-
imising the shareholders’ wealth, the steward also maximises his or her util-
ity functions (Davis et al., 1997; Di Carlo, 2017). Specifically, «the steward’s
opportunity set is constrained by the perception that the utility gained from
pro-organizational behaviour is higher than the utility that can be gained
through individualistic, self-serving behaviour» (Davis et al., 1997, p. 25).
According to stewardship theory, the main board tasks are service tasks
and, specifically, collaborating strategy involvement, including mentor-
ship. The role of boards is guiding management in achieving the missions
and objectives of the enterprise (Huse, 2007). Therefore, like the agency
theory, for stewardship theory the organisation is an instrument used by the
shareholder to maximise the return of his or her investment (Di Carlo,
2017). Moreover, as suggested by the agency theory, the stewardship theo-
ry explains the practice of voluntary disclosure that inspires the corporate
disclosure policy regarding sustainability at the corporate level because the
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proportion of financial and non-financial information can reduce the infor-
mation problem.
3.4. Resource dependence theory
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), resource dependence theory
states that the organisation is an open system, and its behaviour is influ-
enced by external factors. It is based on the assumptions that the resources
in the environment are necessary for the survival of an organisation, but the
procurement process of these resources is uncertain because they are rare,
valuable, and inimitable. 
The acquisition of external resources needed for the organisation caus-
es a modification of the organisation’s power relations with other organisa-
tions. In fact, it leads to a decrease of the organisation’s dependence on oth-
ers and/or to an increase of others’ dependence on it.
Moreover, resource dependence theory is based on the concept of the
power that is central because it allows to control vital resources.
Organisational success is achieved when organisations maximise their
power. In other words, much of the operation and structure of an organisa-
tion depend on the nature of the power relations between more organisa-
tions (Ulrich and Barney, 1984).
In recent years, numerous studies devoted to CSR adopting a vision
based on resources have been conducted (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006).
Specifically, «the resources dependence perspective can be extended to
consider the role of social responsibility disclosure as a signal of improved
social and environmental conduct and hence reputation in those fields
because disclosure influences the external perception of reputation»
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2006, p. 125).
Regarding board diversity, resource dependence theory identifies criti-
cal resources that the board’s function can provide to companies, includ-
ing legitimacy, advice, and counsel (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
According to this theory, thanks to these board resources, the company is
able to understand and respond to its environment, which can help it bet-
ter manage CSR issues. In this perspective, cooperation and connection
are two benefits for companies (Huse, 2007). Thus, directors are also valu-
able resources for companies’ management because they help companies
manage environmental interdependencies thanks to their connections with
stakeholders. 
Regarding the disclosure of board diversity, resource dependence theo-
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ry suggests that it allows an organisation to develop its ability to obtain crit-
ical resources to cover stakeholders’ claims. In this sense, board diversity
can improve the disclosure of value-relevant information, enhancing strate-
gic decisions in relation to external stakeholders (Bravo, 2018). In other
words, according to resource dependence theory, diversity among directors
is a fundamental resource for a firm because it allows the organisation to
adopt relevant disclosure practices to stakeholders, addressing corporate
social disclosure issues (Hoang et al., 2016).
In general terms, resource dependence theory recognises that the board
contributions have a direct impact on a firm’s CSR, such as enhancing the
legitimacy and image of the firm, facilitating access to key resources, or
linking the firm to important stakeholders.
3.5. Stakeholder theory
Stakeholder theory expects that managers must identify and apply
processes aimed at exclusively meeting the groups that have an interest in
the business of a company (Freeman, 1984). In fact, the main goal of this
approach is to manage and integrate the relationships and interests of dif-
ferent kinds of stakeholders, such as shareholders, customers, employees,
communities, and suppliers, in order to ensure the long-term success of the
company (Freeman and McVea, 2001). Freeman (1984, p. 260) states that
stakeholder theory enters in the CSR debate by suggesting that the man-
agers of the corporations have a responsibility not simply to serve the gen-
eral interests of society, but rather to serve the interests of the corporation’s
stakeholders. In conclusion, «stakeholder theory can be used to help define
the social account, first of all by informing the process of stakeholder iden-
tification, and then breaking down the general stakeholder categories into
their constituent» (Freeman, 1984, p. 253).
According to Guthrie et al. (2006), «stakeholder theory highlights
organisational accountability beyond simple economic or financial per-
formance. It suggests that organisations will elect to voluntarily disclose
information about their intellectual, social, and environmental perform-
ance, over and above mandatory requirements, in order to meet real or per-
ceived stakeholder expectations» (p. 256). Therefore, the stakeholder theo-
ry is a powerful means to explain, justify, and understand financial report-
ing and disclosure. In fact, management may use corporate disclosure as a
tool for managing the information needs of most powerful stakeholders and
manipulate them in order to obtain their support, which is necessary for
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their survival (Gray et al., 1996). In other words, this perspective suggests
that Corporate Governance and CSR disclosure should aim to enhance
stakeholder engagement and organisational legitimacy. CSR disclosure is
considered as a strategic response to society’s expectations (Gray et al.,
1995), so the development of a corporate reputation through performance
and disclosure represents a strategic approach to managing stakeholder
relationships (Dias et al., 2017). 
3.6. Legitimacy theory
The legitimacy theory claims that the state of legitimacy is essential for
the survival of an organisation because it is continually seeking to ensure
that its activities respect the limits and norms of the societies in which it
operates (Cuganesan et al., 2007). Referring to the legitimacy theory, there
is a “social contract” that regulates the relation between a company and its
society, with which the society expresses multiple expectations about how
an organisation should conduct its operations. 
According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy is defined as a generalised
perception that the actions of an entity are desirable and appropriate with-
in a social system of values, norms, and beliefs. In particular, organisa-
tional legitimacy is not fixed but changes continuously, and thus organisa-
tions must necessarily adapt their activities to the requirements of legiti-
macy.
However, a legitimacy gap can threaten the legitimacy of an organisa-
tion, and it often arises when the perception of society regarding the way
an organisation should act and the actions actually performed by the organ-
isation diverge (An et al., 2011). In order to reduce the legitimacy gap, an
organisation can adopt various strategies, such as informing its stakehold-
ers on the actual change of its performance or changing the stakeholders’
perceptions about its activities without changing its actual behaviour. Due
to the disclosure of non-financial information, firms are able to legitimise
their performance and manage the perception of their stakeholders (Cucari
et al., 2018). Managers may have different perceptions of legitimacy, and
so they may adopt different strategies to achieve the desired level of legit-
imacy. «Organizations should voluntarily report on information that is
expected by society since the compliance of societal expectations could
result in continued inflows of capital, labour and customers» (An et al.,
2011, p. 577).
Therefore, the public disclosure of information would be an effective
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tool to apply these strategies. In this sense, «legitimacy theory suggests that
reporting is used as a communication mechanism to inform and/or manip-
ulate the perceptions of the firm’s actions» (Tilt, 2009, p. 15). CSR disclo-
sure is able to enhance the effect of CSR on corporate reputation because it
represents a signal of improved social and environmental conduct (Branco
and Rodrigues, 2006). Through the legitimisation strategy, organisations
try to disclose their CSR activities in order to communicate their legitimi-
sation actions.
3.7. Signalling theory
Signalling theory deals with finding possible solutions to problems
related to information asymmetry in social contexts and, consequently,
reducing information asymmetry between two parties (Spence, 2002). The
classic signalling model occurs in a market setting between the seller and
the buyer, where the seller usually has an information advantage over the
buyer about the characteristics of its services and products. Generally, buy-
ers do not have much information about specific goods, but they may have
general perceptions in purchasing that they will do. Consequently, the sell-
er of high-quality products has an incentive to signal the quality of his or
her products to the buyer for legitimising the highest selling price (An et
al., 2011). 
Applying the classic model in a company context, the management of a
company generally has more information than investors with regard to the
specific functioning of the company. Therefore, information asymmetry is
created, and it does not allow investors to fully understand the quality of
the company and, consequently, they cannot compare the quality of the var-
ious companies. Therefore, the high-quality company has an incentive to
signal its advantages to the market, emphasising its superior quality in
order to attract more investors (An et al., 2011).
Regarding non-financial disclosure, corporate disclosure has a positive
effect on corporate performance by signalling legitimacy. In general terms,
«annual reports are a highly useful source of data, because managers of
companies commonly signal what is important through the reporting mech-
anism» (Guthrie and Petty, 2000, p. 244).
According to signalling theory, companies that have a high quality
should signal their advantages to the market. In this way, investors and
other stakeholders are able to evaluate the value of the company and make
decisions with greater awareness and more favourability to the company. At
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the same time, encouraging stakeholders, the signalling would allow a
company to get more investment and reduce the costs of raising capital (An
et al., 2011).
Concerning the relationship between board diversity and corporate rep-
utation, the signalling theory expects that the board gender composition
disclosure may represent a signal able to indicate that the firm is socially
responsible, due to paying attention to women and minorities on a firm’s
board (Bear et al., 2010).
In conclusion, CSR disclosure is treated by signalling theory as a signal
able to improve the organisation’s corporate image, attract investors, and
improve its relationships with stakeholders.
4. Final remarks and further considerations
In the last few years, disclosure of non-financial information has
received growing attention because it could help managers, and other
stakeholders, to make decisions more consciously (Carini et al., 2018).
Thus, in addition to the transparency of financial activities disclosed in the
annual report, stakeholders demand greater corporate accountability
regarding performance, as well as social and environmental issues. In this
perspective, the Corporate Governance is able to influence the transparen-
cy of corporate communications and disclosures, more specifically CSR
disclosure (Adnan et al., 2018). So, board composition is an important
determinant for CSR disclosure, since it is influenced by the choices,
motives, and values of those who are involved in formulating and making
decisions in the organisations (Hoang et al., 2016). 
Regarding the disclosure of non-financial information, the organisation-
al theories analysed in this study outline why organisations disclose corpo-
rate information based on the assumption that corporate disclosure has a
positive effect on corporate performance by reducing information asym-
metry, enhancing transparency, discharging accountability, signalling legit-
imacy, and achieving excellence (An et al., 2011). These evidences are rep-
resented in the following table which indicates how each theory defines the
non-financial information and the board’s role. 
The analysis allowed us to verify that all theories provide a definition of
non-financial information, but only some of these emphasize a direct link
between non-financial information and board’s role.
In detail, agency theory assigns a monitoring function to the board of
directors that can allows the organization to reduce information asymmetry
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between managers and shareholders. Shareholder theory states that based
on the service tasks of the board, an organization is able to enhance trans-
parency with its shareholder, which requires information related to the sus-
tainability of actual value-creation drivers. At the same time, resources
dependence theory recognizes to the board of directors a manage environ-
mental interdependences role that could improve social and environmental
performance, increasing the stakeholder’s perception.
Moreover, the analysis showed that some organisational theories – such
us shareholder theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and signalling
theory – do not explicitly emphasize if and how the board of director can
affect the non-financial information practices of an organisation.
In conclusion, we can observe that there is no universal theory on CSR
disclosure suitable for all kinds of organisations; so, based on the main
organisational theories, non-financial information disclosure should be
considered as an organizational tool to legitimise the firm performance
and manage the perception of enterprises stakeholders. Finally, from an
empirical perspective, the research results suggest to practitioners to
31
Theories Non-financial information Board’s role 
Agency theory Reduces information asymmetry be-
tween managers and shareholders 
Monitoring function 
Stewardship theory Reduces information problems Service tasks 
Shareholder theory Allows the organisation to enhance a 
better transparency towards share-
holder 
n.a.
Stakeholder theory Enhances stakeholder engagement 
and organisational legitimacy 
n.a.
Resources dependence 
theory 
Improves social and environmental 
performance, increasing the stake-
holder’s perception 
Manage environmental inter-
dependences 
Legitimacy theory Allows the organisation to legitimise 
its performance and manage the per-
ception of its stakeholders 
n.a.
Signalling theory Socially responsible, due to paying 
attention to women and minorities on 
a firm’s board 
n.a.
Tab. 1 – Non-financial information and board’s role: some definitions based on the
main organisational theories 
Source: own elaboration.
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enhance the organizational commitment on non-financial information
disclosure practice, also in consideration of the positive association
between the level of CSR disclosure and the enterprise value. Therefore,
in the medium-long term the implementation of CSR strategies could
allow the organization to improve its business and achieve a competitive
advantage.
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